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INTRODUCTION 
Emboldened by their victory in Heller,1 gun rights advocates are 
waging a relentless campaign to strike down what little remains of the 
nation’s relatively anemic gun control regime.2  The Heller opinion 
itself is also partly responsible for generating a seemingly limitless 
 
* Paul and Diane Guenther Chair in American History, Fordham University.  I 
would like to thank the editors of the Fordham Urban Law Journal and my colleague 
Professor Nicholas Johnson for organizing this conference.  I would also like to thank 
Al Brophy, Joe Blocher, Patrick Charles, Chuck Dyke, and Larry Rosenthal for 
helpful discussions that contributed to my thinking about the issues developed in this 
essay.  Mark Frassetto and Ryan Keating provided invaluable research assistance. 
 1. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 2. On modern gun rights gun culture, see JOAN BURBICK, GUN SHOW NATION: 
GUN CULTURE AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2006); ABIGAIL A. KOHN, SHOOTERS: 
MYTHS AND REALITIES OF AMERICAN GUN CULTURES (2005); ROBERT J. SPITZER, 
THE POLITICS OF GUN GONTROL (4th ed. 2008); ADAM WINKLER, GUNFIGHT: THE 
BATTLE OVER THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS IN AMERICA (2011). 
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parade of new lawsuits.3  Legal scholars from across the ideological 
spectrum have attacked the controversial five-to-four decision, both 
for its revisionist rewriting of constitutional history and for its poor 
judicial craftsmanship.4  The opinion raised more questions than it 
answered and left lower courts scrambling to decipher what was 
prohibited by Heller, if anything, short of a total ban on handguns.5  
The decision articulated no theory of judicial scrutiny, provided no 
black letter rules, and failed to create any categories of analysis to 
guide judges.  Instead, it left the courts with an incomplete laundry 
list of presumptively lawful regulations to serve as a model of what 
remained legal.6  In United States v. Masciandaro, Judge J. Harvie 
Wilkinson aptly summarized the problems that Heller’s poor judicial 
craftsmanship wrought: “This case underscores the dilemma faced by 
lower courts in the post-Heller world: how far to push Heller beyond 
its undisputed core holding.”7 
The first section of this Article examines the continuing relevance 
of history in the post-Heller era.  The second section focuses on 
conceptions of the right to bear arms and the right to carry in the 
Founding era.  Apart from service in militia, there is little evidence of 
a broad constitutional consensus on a right to carry arms in public.  
The third section analyzes some of the myths and realities about early 
American gun regulation.  The fourth section locates the legal ideal of 
traveling armed in public in a distinctively southern tradition that was 
a minority strain within Antebellum law.  The final section of this 
Article explores the alternative theory of robust arms regulation that 
emerged by the era of the Fourteenth Amendment and became the 
dominant tradition in American law.  The existence of this regulatory 
 
 3. Post Heller Litigation Summary, LAW CENTER TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, 
http://smartgunlaws.org/category/second-amendment/ (last updated Nov. 7, 2012). 
 4. For a lucid critique of Heller from the right, see J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of 
Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 VA. L. REV. 253 (2009).  For 
an equally trenchant critique from the political Left, see Reva B. Siegel, Dead or 
Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191 
(2008). 
 5. See, e.g., United States v. Decastro, 682 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2012) (purchasing 
firearms in another state); United States v. Staten, 666 F.3d 154 (4th Cir. 2011) 
(possession of firearm by domestic violence misdemeanants); United States v. 
Booker, 644 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2011) (domestic violence misdemeanants); United 
States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d 437 (5th Cir. 2011) (undocumented immigrants); 
United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010) (possession of firearm with 
obliterated serial number); United States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(felons). 
 6. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27. 
 7. United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 475 (4th Cir. 2011). 
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tradition has remained hidden from modern scholars and courts 
because support for high levels of gun regulation was so pervasive 
outside of the South that few of these laws were ever challenged in 
court. 
I.  HISTORY AND THE FUTURE OF GUN REGULATION: HELLER’S 
LEGACY 
Rather than close the book on historical argument, Heller appears 
to have done the opposite.  The court stated this point succinctly in 
United States v. Masciandaro: “[H]istorical meaning enjoys a 
privileged interpretative role in the Second Amendment context.”8  
Unfortunately, judges are in the unenviable position of evaluating the 
complex and contradictory historical evidence paraded before them.  
Separating historical myths from historical realities, distinguishing 
historical fact from error, and disentangling law office history from 
rigorous historical scholarship are serious problems for the courts in 
this area of the law.9 
One of the most controversial issues to arise in the wake of Heller 
is the right to carry firearms outside of the home.  This issue is 
 
 8. Id. at 470.  Courts are not just divided over how to weigh particular types of 
historical evidence, but there is some disagreement over which period of history is 
relevant to the various types of Second Amendment claims being made.  Should the 
courts focus on Founding era materials, post-enactment sources, or evidence from the 
era of the Fourteenth Amendment?  Justice Scalia employed late nineteenth century 
sources to interpret Founding era approaches to preambles, an approach that only 
underscores Heller’s intellectual incoherence.  For additional discussion of Heller’s 
many temporal oddities, see Siegel, supra note 4, and Saul Cornell, Originalism on 
Trial: The Use and Abuse of History in District of Columbia v. Heller, 69 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 625, 639 (2008).  For a more charitable reading of Heller that attempts to bring 
some order to this question, see Allen Rostron, Justice Breyer’s Triumph in the Third 
Battle over the Second Amendment, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 703 (2012). 
 9. On the problems of Second Amendment “law office history” and historical 
myths clouding Second Amendment discussions, see infra note 112 and 
accompanying text.  Rostron offers some thoughtful comments on the inherent 
difficulty of using history to resolve modern issues such as the scope of Second 
Amendment protections for those convicted of domestic violence misdemeanors:  
Exploring how American society viewed domestic violence in the Founding 
era might be a fascinating topic for a doctoral dissertation, but it would 
undoubtedly be a challenging undertaking for judges, and ultimately a 
pointless one because the historical record on an issue of such complexity 
undoubtedly contains much to support many different views.  Judges simply 
will be disappointed if they hope to find specific and clear historical 
evidence about the Founding generation’s attitude toward the rights of 
domestic abusers.  
Rostron, supra note 8, at 751–52 (citations omitted). 
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currently being litigated in the Fourth Circuit and a decision may well 
be rendered by the time this Article is published.10  Masciandaro 
reveals the problems that Heller has created.  In Masciandaro, the 
defendant was arrested for possessing a loaded firearm in a national 
park.11  The court applied an intermediate scrutiny test and found that 
the statute in question, which prohibited loaded firearms in national 
parks, easily passed constitutional muster.12  The government’s 
interest was important and the means chosen to effectuate this goal 
were substantially related to that interest.13  Although the three-judge 
panel agreed on this point, there was substantial disagreement over 
the scope of Heller’s holding regarding the right to bear arms outside 
of the home.14  In Masciandaro, the majority refused to wade into this 
question.  Judge Wilkinson and Judge Duffy embraced a minimalist 
reading of Heller, counseling judicial restraint, particularly on this 
crucial question: 
There may or may not be a Second Amendment right in some places 
beyond the home, but we have no idea what those places are, what 
the criteria for selecting them should be, what sliding scales of 
scrutiny might apply to them, or any one of a number of other 
questions.  It is not clear in what places public authorities may ban 
firearms altogether without shouldering the burdens of litigation.15  
Judges Wilkinson and Duffy took no position on this issue, but 
their argument implicitly suggested that one could make a plausible 
case that Heller’s holding established no right to carry firearms 
outside the home.  Judge Niemeyer, by contrast, argued that Heller 
did assert the existence of a right beyond the home: 
Consistent with the historical understanding of the right to keep and 
bear arms outside the home, the Heller Court’s description of its 
actual holding also implies that a broader right exists.  The Court 
stated that its holding applies to the home, where the need “for 
defense of self, family, and property is most acute,” suggesting that 
 
 10. The notion that Heller ought to be read to include a right to carry outside of 
the home has been most fully developed in two cases decided in the Fourth Circuit. 
See United States v. Weaver, No. 2:09-cr-00222, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29613 (S.D. 
W. Va. Mar. 7, 2012); Woollard v. Sheridan, No. L-10-2068, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
28498 (D. Md. Mar. 2, 2012).  An appeal in the latter case was being briefed at the 
time that this Article went to press. 
 11. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 459. 
 12. Id. at 473. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 469. 
 15. Id. at 475 (Wilkinson, J., concurring). 
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some form of the right applies where that need is not “most acute.”  
Further, when the Court acknowledged that the Second 
Amendment right was not unlimited, it listed as examples of 
regulations that were presumptively lawful, those “laws forbidding 
the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and 
government buildings.”  If the Second Amendment right were 
confined to self-defense in the home, the Court would not have 
needed to express a reservation for “sensitive places” outside of the 
home.16 
The logic of Judge Niemeyer’s argument seems especially weak 
when read against the actual beliefs and practices that the American 
legal tradition demonstrates.  The assertion that the need for self-
defense is most acute in the home implies nothing about the existence 
of a right to self-defense outside the home.  Even under Heller’s 
flawed version of history, one plausibly could argue that the Founders 
decided to constitutionalize the right only in the home.  Self-defense 
beyond the home implicates far broader questions of public safety.  It 
makes historical sense that the Founding generation decided to leave 
the resolutions of these difficult questions to the more flexible 
standards afforded by the common law and the public policy 
preferences of individual legislatures.  The fact that the Founding 
generation needed weapons to train and hunt also has little bearing 
on how these weapons might have been used outside of the home 
because pistols were not typically part of the standard weaponry of 
the militia.  Finally, the fact that some states and localities chose to 
ban carrying in sensitive places while others chose to enact broad 
bans only underscores that gun regulation in American history 
reflects the diversity of the American historical experience.17 
II.  THE SCOPE OF THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS IN THE FOUNDING 
ERA 
Virginia was the first state to draft a new Constitution and 
Declaration of Rights.  George Mason, the primary architect of the 
Virginia Declaration of Rights, was a leading patriot and took a major 
 
 16. Id. at 468 (internal citations omitted).  See the discussion infra Part IV for 
specific examples of different types of arms regulation. 
 17. For a discussion of pistol ownership in the founding era, see infra note 81 and 
accompanying text.  On the militia’s standard armaments, muskets and rifles, see 
discussion infra notes 66–93 and accompanying text.  On regulation, see infra notes 
66–83 and accompanying text. 
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role in the creation of the new state’s militia.18  An early advocate for 
colonial independence, he became an outspoken champion of the 
militia.  Mason urged his fellow citizens to enact a law to put the 
colony’s militia in a state of readiness for possible war with Britain.  
Mason’s vision of the militia invoked traditional Whig ideas.19  On 
January 17, 1775, Mason prepared this set of resolutions for the 
Fairfax County Committee of Safety, an important institution 
responsible for coordinating Virginia’s military efforts: 
Resolved, That this Committee do concur in opinion with the 
Provincial Committee of the Province of Maryland, that a well 
regulated Militia, composed of gentlemen freeholders, and other 
freemen, is the natural strength and only stable security of a free 
Government.20 
Mason’s emphasis on the need for the militia to be composed of 
property holders reflected a view common among members of 
Virginia’s gentry elite that it was dangerous to arm the “rabble.”21  
Without the guidance of gentlemen, an armed population might easily 
become a mob rather than a well-regulated militia.  The radicalism of 
the revolution pushed Mason and other Virginians to embrace a more 
inclusive conception of the militia.22  The language that Virginia 
eventually adopted asserted that the militia was “composed of the 
body of the people,” a formulation that reflected the more 
democratic ethos associated with Revolutionary ideology.  When the 
committee charged with producing a declaration of rights revised 
Mason’s original draft, they settled on the following language: 
 
 18. SAUL CORNELL, A WELL-REGULATED MILITIA: THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND 
THE ORIGINS OF GUN CONTROL IN AMERICA 18–20 (2006) [hereinafter CORNELL, A 
WELL-REGULATED MILITIA]. 
 19. Traditional Whig views of the militia may be found in the writings of the 
Commonwealth tradition. See 3 JAMES BURGH, POLITICAL DISQUISITIONS 400–05 
(Philadelphia, 1775); ANDREW FLETCHER, A DISCOURSE OF GOVERNMENT WITH 
RELATION TO MILITIAS 40–41, 44–47 (Edinburgh, 1698); ALGERNON SIDNEY, 
DISCOURSES CONCERNING GOVERNMENT Ch. 2 (London, 1698); JOHN TOLAND, THE 
MILITIA REFORM’D 16, 46–47 (London, 1695). See generally JOHN TRENCHARD, AN 
ARGUMENT SHEWING, THAT A STANDING ARMY IS INCONSISTENT WITH A FREE 
GOVERNMENT AND ABSOLUTELY DESTRUCTIVE TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
ENGLISH MONARCHY (London, 1697). 
 20. 1 GEORGE MASON, Fairfax County Committee of Safety Proceedings, in THE 
PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON 212 (Robert A. Rutland ed., 1970). 
 21. CORNELL, WELL-REGULATED MILITIA, supra note 18, at 18–19. 
 22. See CORNELL, A WELL-REGULATED MILITIA, supra note 18, at 18–20. See 
generally GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 
(1992) (discussing the radicalism of the Revolution). 
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That a well regulated militia, composed of the body of the people, 
trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defence of a free 
state; that standing armies, in time of peace, should be avoided, as 
dangerous to liberty; and that, in all cases, the military should be 
under strict subordination to, and governed by, the civil power.23 
Virginia’s Declaration of Rights made no mention of the right to 
bear arms or a right of self-defense.24  The absence of such language 
did not mean that Virginians did not esteem the right of self-defense; 
rather, it merely underscored that they believed such a right was 
adequately protected under the common law.25  The militia focus of 
Mason’s language troubled Thomas Jefferson, one of the most 
forward-looking and innovative legal thinkers in the Old Dominion.26  
Jefferson proposed his own alternative to Mason’s language, which 
included a more expansive statement of the right of individuals to 
keep and use firearms.27  Jefferson first proposed that “no freeman 
shall be debarred the use of arms” but decided to revise his proposal 
to limit the exercise of this right.28  Under Jefferson’s revised 
formulation, the right was confined to an individual’s home or lands.29  
His revised proposal suggested that the Virginia Declaration of 
Rights include language asserting that “no freeman shall be debarred 
the use of arms [within his own lands or tenements].”30  Jefferson 
obviously disagreed with the convention and sought to 
constitutionalize the common law right of self-defense, but his 
proposal was not enacted.  His failed proposal, limiting the right to 
arms to the home, mirrors the right that the majority asserted in 
Heller.31 
 
 23. 1 GEORGE MASON, Final Draft of the Virginia Declaration of Rights, in THE 
PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON, supra note 20, at 288; see also 1 GEORGE MASON, 
Fairfax County Militia Plan “for Embodying the People”, in THE PAPERS OF GEORGE 
MASON, supra note 20, at 215 [hereinafter MASON, Fairfax County Militia Plan].  
Mason noted that the volunteer companies were an expedient until “a regular and 
proper Militia law for the Defense of the Country shall be enacted by the Legislature 
of this Colony.” Id. at 216; see also 1 GEORGE MASON, Virginia Declaration of 
Rights, in THE PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON, supra note 20, at 274–76. 
 24. See VA. CONST. of 1776. 
 25. See CORNELL, A WELL-REGULATED MILITIA, supra note 18, at 26–30. 
 26. 1 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 344 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950). 
 27. See id. at 353. 
 28. Id. 
 29. See id. at 353, 363. 
 30. Id. 
 31. See id.; see also District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 575–76 (2008). 
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Virginia’s Constitution was crafted by members of a planter elite 
who were often compared to the great leaders of the Roman 
Republic, men such as Brutus or Cato.  Pennsylvania’s Constitution, 
the first to expressly protect a right to bear arms, owed far more to 
plebeian ideas than to patrician ones.32  The framers of Pennsylvania’s 
Constitution were men of humble origins who spoke on behalf of the 
laboring classes and the industrious middling sorts, such as tradesmen 
and small farmers.33  One prominent group that took a leading role in 
crafting the Pennsylvania Constitution hailed from the western part 
of the state.  These men were animated by long-standing grievances 
against the eastern Quaker elite who had dominated the legislature 
for most of the colonial period.  For more than a decade prior to 
American independence, backcountry Pennsylvanians pressed for a 
militia law to help them protect their communities against threats 
from Indians along the frontier.34  The Quaker-dominated assembly 
rebuffed these appeals, preferring to negotiate, not fight, with the 
Native population.35  The most notorious incident in this decade-long 
struggle was the Paxton Boys’ Uprising, the massacre of a group of 
defenseless Conestoga Indians by backcountry Pennsylvanians in 
1763.36  The Apology of the Paxton Volunteers framed their 
grievances against the Pennsylvania government in the following 
terms: 
When we applied to the Government for Relief, the far greater part 
of our Assembly were Quakers, some of whom made light of our 
Sufferings & plead Conscience, so that they could neither take Arms 
in Defense of themselves or their Country, nor form a Militia law to 
oblige the Inhabitants to arm.37 
 
 32. For a discussion of the popular plebeian radicalism of Pennsylvania’s 
constitutional tradition, see CORNELL, A WELL-REGULATED MILITIA, supra note 18, 
at 20–23. 
 33. The best historical account of the Pennsylvania arms bearing clause is found 
in Nathan Kozuskanich, Defending Themselves: The Original Understanding of the 
Right to Bear Arms, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 1041, 1044–46 (2007). 
 34. Brief for Historians on Early American Legal, Constitutional and 
Pennsylvania History as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, City of Chicago at 
13–14, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (No. 08-1521), 2010 WL 
59031. 
 35. See id. at 15. 
 36. See KEVIN KENNY, PEACEABLE KINGDOM LOST: THE PAXTON BOYS AND THE 
DESTRUCTION OF WILLIAM PENN’S HOLY EXPERIMENT 140–71 (2009). 
 37. The Apology of the Paxton Volunteers, in THE PAXTON PAPERS 187 (John R. 
Dunbar ed., 1764). 
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The text of the Paxton apology anticipated the language eventually 
included by Pennsylvanians in their Declaration of Rights, which 
asserted that the people had a right to “bear arms in defence of 
themselves and the state.”38  There is no evidence from the 
Revolutionary era that Pennsylvanians were concerned about threats 
to the common-law right of individual self-defense.  The Quaker-
dominated legislature had not attempted to disarm backcountry 
inhabitants, nor had it passed laws that prevented them from 
defending their homes against intruders.39  What the assembly refused 
to do was enact a militia law or provide arms for frontier communities 
to mount a concerted collective defense, including retaliatory raids on 
Indian communities.40  The language eventually incorporated into the 
Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights reflected this bitter struggle over 
public safety, and had little to do with public concern over an 
individual right to keep arms for self-protection.41  The first discussion 
of the right to bear arms in Pennsylvania’s Declaration of Rights 
linked this to an obligation to support public defense.42  It also set a 
pattern for other states by noting the need to balance the right to bear 
arms against the equally important right not to be forced to bear 
arms.43  This latter right was vital to religious pacifists opposed to 
bearing arms, including Quakers and Mennonites.  Thus, the first 
clause to deal with the right to bear arms declared that: 
[E]very member of society hath a right to be protected in the 
enjoyment of life, liberty and property, and therefore is bound to 
contribute his proportion towards the expence of that protection, 
and yield his personal service when necessary, or an equivalent 
thereto: But no part of a man’s property can be justly taken from 
him, or applied to public uses, without his consent, or that of his 
legal representatives: Nor can any man who is conscientiously 
scrupulous of bearing arms, be justly compelled thereto, if he will 
 
 38. PA. CONST. of 1776, art. XIII. 
 39. Brief for Thirty-Four Professional Historians and Legal Historians as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Respondents at 11, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 
(2010) (No. 08-1521), 2010 WL 59025. 
 40. See id. at 13. 
 41. See id. at 17–22. 
 42. See PA. CONST. of 1776, art. VIII. 
 43. See generally Joseph Blocher, The Right Not to Keep or Bear Arms, 64 STAN. 
L. REV. 1 (2012) (discussing the significance of this neglected side of the right to bear 
arms debate). 
CORNELL_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 2/6/2013  10:46 PM 
1704 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXIX 
pay such equivalent: Nor are the people bound by any laws but such 
as they have in like manner assented, to for their common good.44 
By including a right to bear arms and a right not to be forced to 
bear arms, the Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights struck a 
compromise position between the opposing demands of the 
backcountry residents and the pacifists. Only after asserting the civic 
obligation to bear arms did the  
Constitution then affirm: 
That the people have a right to bear arms for the defence of 
themselves and the state; and as standing armies in the time of 
peace, are dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be kept up: And 
that the military should be kept under strict subordination, to, and 
governed by, the civil power.45 
As was invariably true in most Revolutionary-era constitutions, the 
right to bear arms was also set against the danger posed by standing 
armies, a juxtaposition that only accentuated the military character of 
the right.  Pennsylvania’s Constitution dealt with the private use of 
arms in a separate context.46  The Pennsylvania Constitution explicitly 
protected the right to hunt in a separate provision from the right to 
bear arms.47  In contrast to England, where game laws made hunting 
the exclusive province of the wealthy, Pennsylvania provided its 
citizens with the “liberty to fowl and hunt in seasonable times on the 
lands they hold, and on all other lands therein not inclosed; and in 
like manner to fish in all boatable waters, and others not private 
property.”48  The formulation of this right implied a right of 
government regulation, since hunting might be limited as to time, 
place, and manner.  Still, protecting the right of all citizens to hunt 
made clear an opposition to the kinds of restrictions that the English 
game laws codified and that were used to effectively disarm a 
significant portion of the English population.49 
 
 44. PA. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, para. 13, reprinted in 
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE SEVERAL INDEPENDENT STATES OF AMERICA 78 (London, 
1782); see also Kozuskanich, supra note 33, at 1065.  Kozuskanich also deals with 
anachronistic modern gun rights readings of this text. 
 45. PA. CONST. of 1776, art. XIII. 
 46. See id., art. VIII. 
 47. See id. § 43. 
 48. Id. 
 49. See Saul Cornell, St. George Tucker’s Lecture Notes, the Second 
Amendment, and Originalist Methodology: A Critical Comment, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 
COLLOQUY 406, 407–08 (2009). 
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Modern gun rights advocates read Pennsylvania’s arms bearing 
provision as protecting an individual right, rewriting the text so that 
the phrase “bear arms in defense of themselves” is synonymous with 
the phrase “bear arms in defense of himself.”50  While the latter 
individualistic formulation of the right gained currency in many 
places in the nineteenth century, it did not gain broad acceptance in 
state constitutions in the Founding era.51  Yet, even if one accepted 
the anachronistic reading of Pennsylvania’s Constitution, it is hard to 
justify using it as a model of Founding era constitutionalism.  The 
Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 broke with nearly every standard 
practice in America’s emerging constitutional culture.  Pennsylvania 
rejected a unicameral legislature and a unitary executive, instead 
entrusting aspects of judicial review to the Council of Censors, a body 
charged with preserving the Constitution inviolate.52  Pennsylvania’s 
Constitution was controversial from its inception.  John Adams 
wrote, “Good God! The people of Pennsylvania in seven years will be 
glad to petition the Crown of Britain for reconciliation in order to be 
delivered from the tyranny of their new Constitution.”53 
Neither Virginia nor Pennsylvania expressly protected a right to 
“keep and bear arms.”54  The first state to introduce this language into 
American law was Massachusetts.  The 1780 Constitution adopted by 
the State declared that: 
 
 50. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 601 (2008). 
 51. Supporters of the individual rights reading of the 1776 Pennsylvania 
Constitution have been unable to identify any contemporary evidence that this was 
the dominant understanding of its framers or the general understanding of 
Pennsylvanians.  Instead, they have used James Wilson’s comments on the 1790 
Constitution as the basis for reconstructing the meaning of the earlier document.  Not 
only did two different bodies draft these provisions, but they structured and worded 
them differently.  Thus, the earlier provision links the right to bear arms with the 
traditional Whig attack on standing armies.  The latter provision clearly separates the 
two ideas into separate provisions.  It is also not entirely clear how typical Wilson’s 
thinking was on this question.  Albert Gallatin, another member of the 1790 
convention, framed the right in rather different terms, giving it a more clearly 
military reading.  Nor do Pennsylvania courts appear to have seen this provision as 
having constitutionalized the common law right of self-defense.  For further 
discussion and analysis of this controversy and the relevant sources, see Kozuskanich, 
supra note 33.  On the changing language of the arms bearing provisions of state 
constitutions, see CORNELL, A WELL-REGULATED MILITIA, supra note 18. 
 52. See PA. CONST. of 1776. 
 53. William Pencak, The Promise of the Revolution, 1750-1800, in 
PENNSYLVANIA:  A HISTORY OF THE COMMONWEALTH 121 (William Pencak & 
Randal Miller eds., 2002) (quoting John Adams). 
 54. See generally VA. CONST. of 1776; PA. CONST. of 1776. 
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The people have a right to keep and to bear arms for the common 
defence.  And as in time of peace armies are dangerous to liberty 
they ought not to be maintained without the consent of the 
legislature; and the military power shall always be held in an exact 
subordination to the civil authority, and be governed by it.55 
The convention’s inclusion of the word “keep” built on an 
assumption implicit in the state’s militia statute, which had been 
enacted in the colonial era.56  Apart from the poor, most white male 
citizens were required to outfit themselves with military-quality 
weapons.57  As was true for virtually every state’s militia laws, 
muskets, not pistols, were the legally designated weapon of the 
militia.  The only exception to this were the horsemen’s pistols 
required of dragoons and other mounted units.58 
One of most remarkable features of the framing and ratification of 
the Massachusetts Constitution was the decision to submit the draft 
constitution to the towns for comment.  These responses provide a 
rare glimpse into popular constitutional ideas in the Founding era, 
including ideas about armed self-defense.59  Although individual 
towns produced dozens of detailed responses to the proposed 
constitution and identified many flaws in the new frame of 
government, the right to keep and bear arms did not prompt 
extensive commentary.  The response of the western town of 
Williamsburgh, however, faulted the constitution’s exclusive focus on 
common defense and proposed the following alternative: “1st that we 
esteem it an essential privilege to keep Arms in Our houses for Our 
Own Defence and while we Continue honest and Lawfull Subjects of 
Government we Ought Never to be deprived of them.”60 
This alternative formulation clearly frames the right in terms 
similar to Heller’s core right of self-defense in the home.61  This 
limited formulation of the right was also evidenced in the language 
 
 55. MASS CONST. of 1780, pt. 1, art. XVII, in THE POPULAR SOURCES OF 
POLITICAL AUTHORITY 446 (Oscar Handlin & Mary Handlin eds., 1966). 
 56. CORNELL, WELL-REGULATED MILITIA, supra note 18, at 12. 
 57. For a discussion of colonial militia laws, see id. at 14–17. 
 58. For a good example from the era of the Second Amendment, see An Act for 
Regulating and Governing the Militia of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts 
(1793), reprinted in ACTS AND RESOLVES PASSED BY THE GENERAL COURT 294 
(Wright & Potter Printing Co. 1895) [hereinafter Massachusetts Act]. 
 59. See generally supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
 60. Town of Williamsburgh (1780), in THE POPULAR SOURCES OF POLITICAL 
AUTHORITY, supra note 55, at 624. 
 61. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008). 
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chosen by Samuel Adams in his proposed amendment submitted to, 
but ultimately rejected by, the Massachusetts Ratification 
Convention.62  Similar to the town of Williamsburgh, Adams defined 
the contours of the right in terms of an individual right for one’s own 
defense.63 
Although there is little doubt that Adams and other Americans 
believed they had a legal right to defend their homes with deadly 
force if necessary, there is no evidence that there was broad legal 
consensus that states needed to constitutionalize the protection of this 
right outside of the home.64  Balancing the needs of public safety 
against the exercise of this right was something best left to the 
individual state legislatures.65 
III.  GUN REGULATION IN THE FOUNDING ERA AND EARLY 
REPUBLIC: MYTHS AND REALITIES 
It is important to recognize that the Founding generation had little 
trouble accepting that one might have different legal standards for the 
use of arms within the home and in public.  Thomas Jefferson’s legal 
thoughts provide yet another example of this type of legal double 
standard for arms.  In a bill he wrote to deal with poaching, Jefferson 
included a provision restricting the ability to travel armed with a 
musket outside of the context of militia activity.66  The proposed law 
penalized any poacher who “bear[s] a gun out of his inclosed ground, 
unless whilst performing military duty.”67  The purpose of the statute 
was to make legal distinctions between the different levels of 
regulation appropriate to the use of firearms in different contexts.68  
In public, militia weapons enjoyed greater legal protection than 
 
 62. See id. at 601. 
 63. See id.; see also Town of Williamsburgh (1780), supra note 60, at 624. 
 64. Even if one canvassed the most expansive statements of the right from the 
ratification debates, none of these can plausibly be read to justify traveling armed.  In 
this regard, the language proposed by Samuel Adams, which implicates a home-based 
right, is instructive. See sources cited supra, note 63.  Even accepting Heller’s dubious 
claims that the phrase “bear arms” simply meant to carry a gun and had no 
connection to the militia, one could easily imagine that the right to carry such a gun 
did not extend beyond the home, which is precisely the conception defended by 
Jefferson, Adams, and the residents of Williamsburgh. 
 65. See discussions of Brutus and Tench Coxe, infra Part III, and the idea of 
federalism embodied in the United States Constitution. See U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 66. Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Preservation of Deer, in 2 THE PAPERS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 444 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
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pistols and other non-military weapons.  All weapons, even those 
owned for militia purposes, were subject to police power regulation.69 
Although there were hundreds of essays published both for and 
against the Constitution, the subject of hunting and the right of self-
defense outside the home produced little commentary.70  Indeed, 
there is pretty strong evidence that Federalists and Anti-Federalists 
each saw these issues as matters best left to the state legislatures.71  
Although Federalist Tench Coxe and the Anti-Federalist author 
Brutus agreed on few things, they were in complete agreement on this 
issue.  Brutus made this point expressly when he wrote, “[I]t ought to 
be left to the state governments to provide for the protection and 
defence of the citizen against the hand of private violence, and the 
wrongs done or attempted by individuals to each other . . . .”72  
Federalist Tench Coxe echoed this understanding, writing that “[t]he 
states will regulate and administer the criminal law, exclusively of 
Congress.”73  The police power of the states would not be diminished 
under the new Constitution and the individual states would continue 
to legislate on all matters “such as unlicensed public houses, 
nuisances, and many other things of the like nature.”74 
Although individual laws varied, a number of states expressly 
provided that weapons owned in relation to militia service were 
exempt from seizure in any legal proceedings for debt or delinquent 
 
 69. There is broad consensus among professional historians on this point. See, 
e.g., Brief for Thirty-Four Professional Historians and Legal Historians as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Respondents at 5–12, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 
3020 (2010) (No. 08-1521), 2010 WL 59025, at *4–6.  The distinguished Massachusetts 
judge George Thatcher wrote about the right to use arms in analogous terms and 
recognized the breadth of the state’s police power in this area. See Saul Cornell, The 
Original Meaning Of Original Understanding: A Neo-Blackstonian Critique, 67 MD. 
L. REV. 150, 161 (2007).  Thatcher’s thinking has been largely ignored by judges and 
legal scholars but merits closer attention. See id.  For a more detailed discussion of 
Thatcher, see Patrick J. Charles, Scribble Scrabble, the Second Amendment, and 
Historical Guideposts: A Short Reply to Lawrence Rosenthal and Joyce Lee 
Malcolm, 105 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 227 (2011). 
 70. See Jack N. Rakove, The Second Amendment: The Highest Stage of 
Originalism, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 103 (2000). 
 71. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 71–74. 
 72. BRUTUS, ESSAYS OF BRUTUS VII, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST 358, 400–05 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981). 
 73. Tench Coxe, A Freeman, PA. GAZETTE, Jan. 23, 1788, reprinted in FRIENDS 
OF THE CONSTITUTION: WRITINGS OF THE “OTHER” FEDERALISTS 82 (Colleen A. 
Sheehan & Gary L. McDowell eds., 1998). 
 74. Id. 
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taxes.75  The treatment in a Philadelphia edition of the Conductor 
Generalis, a guidebook for justices of the peace, sheriffs, and 
constables devoted a long section to goods which were subject to a 
“distress for rent” action.76  Although tradesmen’s tools were exempt, 
no provision was made for firearms, apart from muskets and rifles 
owned by militiamen.77  A comparable guide written for sheriffs and 
tax collectors residing in Maine, published more than three decades 
later, evidenced a similar rule.78  While clothes, bibles, schoolbooks, 
and tools necessary for a trade were exempt, the only firearms 
accorded this privilege were those of the militia.79  As The Maine Civil 
Officer put it, “[e]very citizen enrolled, and providing himself with 
the arms, ammunition, and accoutrements required by law, shall hold 
the same exempt from all suits, distresses, execution or sale for debts, 
or for the payment of taxes.”80 
Patterns of gun ownership in the Founding era also help account 
for the very different legal protections accorded ordinary pistols and 
militia weapons. 81  Americans owned many more long guns and the 
 
 75. THE CONDUCTOR GENERALIS, OR, THE OFFICE, DUTY, AND AUTHORITY OF 
THE JUSTICES OF THE PEACE 142 (1792). 
 76. Id. at 142-43. 
 77. Id. at 142. 
 78. JEREMIAH PERLEY, THE MAINE CIVIL OFFICER OR THE POWERS AND DUTIES 
OF SHERIFFS, CORONERS, CONSTABLES, AND COLLECTORS OF TAXES 29-30 (1825).  
The statute describing this legal exemption was passed in 1792.  For similar 
discussions from a New Jersey guide from the same period, see JAMES EWING, A 
TREATISE ON THE OFFICE AND DUTY OF A JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 70 (1832). 
 79. See PERLEY, supra note 78, at 29–30. 
 80. Id. 
 81. The question of exactly how well-armed Americans were in the eighteenth 
century has been an explosive one.  No serious scholar now accepts the discredited 
argument of Michael Bellesiles that Americans were poorly armed. See generally 
MICHAEL BELLESILES, ARMING AMERICA: THE ORIGINS OF A NATIONAL GUN 
CULTURE (2000).  For devastating critiques of his thesis, see Ira D. Gruber, Of Arms 
and Men: Arming America and Military History, 59 WM. & MARY Q. 217 (2002); 
James Lindgren & Justin Lee Heather, Counting Guns in Early America, 43 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1777 (2002); Gloria L. Main, Many Things Forgotten: The Use of 
Probate Records in Arming America, 59 WM. & MARY Q. 211 (2002); Randolph 
Roth, Guns, Gun Culture, and Homicide: The Relationship between Firearms, the 
Uses of Firearms, and Interpersonal Violence, 59 WM. & MARY Q. 223 (2002).  
Among the many blunders made by Bellesiles, he failed to distinguish between 
pistols and long guns.  In an important new study of the patterns of arms ownership 
in the eighteenth century, Amherst College social historian Kevin Sweeny notes that 
pistols constituted a small fraction of the weapons owned by Americans in the 
Founding era. Americans clearly preferred long guns over hand guns. See Kevin 
Sweeney, Firearms and Colonial Militias, in THE SECOND AMENDMENT  ON TRIAL: 
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law bestowed additional constitutional and legal protections on such 
weapons, including a right to travel to muster and train with these 
weapons, recognizing the utility of these weapons for militia activity.82  
Yet, it is worth noting that even these militia weapons were subject to 
reasonable police power regulations.83 
The notion that the use of militia weapons outside of the home 
enjoyed even greater protection than the use of pistols outside of the 
home makes perfect sense given the language of the Second 
Amendment.  Although Heller held that self-defense in the home was 
one core value enshrined in the Second Amendment, it is hard to 
dispute that the Amendment also protects the goal of arming the 
militia.84  Because pistols had little value in hunting and were not 
standard equipment for ordinary militiamen, it made sense to carve 
out a broader right to travel with a musket or a rifle since these 
weapons were needed for training and suitable for hunting.85  
Although one might travel with a musket to muster, the state could 
prohibit traveling with a loaded weapon or discharging a weapon on a 
muster day without permission.86 
It is easy to mischaracterize the Founding era’s recognition that 
militia weapons might be used in public with a broad right to carry 
arms.  Michael O’Shea, a gun rights scholar, makes this error in his 
gloss on a well-known passage from the Virginia jurist, St. George 
Tucker.87  In his discussion of the law of treason, Tucker commented 
on the right to carry a musket in his home state of Virginia.  Tucker 
noted that simply carrying military weapons in Virginia did not imply 
 
CRITICAL ESSAYS ON DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA V. HELLER (forthcoming 2013) [copy 
on file with author]. 
 82. See sources cited supra note 81. 
 83. See Massachusetts Act, supra note 58, at 380; see also District of Columbia v. 
Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 633–34 (2008). 
 84. U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 85. See An Act Concerning the Militia § 120, 1866 Mass. Acts 197 (“A soldier 
who unnecessarily or without order from a superior officer comes to any parade with 
his musket, rifle or pistol loaded with ball, slug or shot, or so loads the same while on 
parade, or unnecessarily or without order from a superior officer discharges the same 
when going to, or returning from or upon parade, shall forfeit not less than five nor 
more than twenty dollars.”); An Act for the Regulating, Training and Arraying of the 
Militia, pt. 11, 1778 N.J. Laws 45; An Act for Forming and Regulating the Militia 
Within this State, and for Repealing All the Laws Heretofore Made for that Purpose 
§ 7, 1786 N.H. Laws 409. 
 86. See generally 1785 Va. Acts 9. 
 87. See Michael P. O’Shea, Modeling the Second Amendment Right to Carry 
Arms: Judicial Tradition and the Scope of “Bearing Arms” for Self-Defense, 61 AM. 
U. L. REV. 585, 637 (2012). 
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any treasonous intent, a fact that marked a departure from English 
precedents.  O’Shea ignores the clear military context of Tucker’s 
discussion, eliding the difference between a right to carry militia 
weapons outside of the home and the right to carry a pistol for self-
defense.  Tucker’s discussion of this issue responded to the 
prosecution of Fries’s Rebellion in Pennsylvania.88  Tucker took 
exception to Judge Samuel Chase’s use of English legal authorities in 
construing the meaning of treason.89  Tucker noted that in contrast to 
English law, the mere possession and use of military style weapons 
did not provide grounds for a treason prosecution in Virginia: 
But ought that circumstances of itself [array with military weapons], 
to create any such presumption in America, where the right to bear 
arms is recognized and secured in the constitution itself.  In many 
parts of the United States, a man no more thinks, of going out of his 
house on any occasion, without his rifle or musket in his hand, than 
an European fine gentleman without his sword by his side.90 
Tucker’s remarks are easily taken out of context and 
misinterpreted, so it is worth taking the time to highlight exactly what 
he claimed.  The first point to recognize is that Tucker was talking 
about the use of military weapons by citizens who would have been 
members of the eighteenth-century militia.91  Tucker is quite clear 
that muskets and rifles, not pistols, are protected by this 
constitutional right.92  Second, Tucker himself notes that this 
expansive conception of a constitutional right to carry military 
weapons in public was not universally acknowledged by all judges at 
the time.  Justice Chase certainly did not share Tucker’s views and the 
successful prosecution of the rebels in both the Whiskey Rebellion 
and Fries’s Rebellion demonstrate that Tucker’s views were not the 
norm outside of Virginia.93 
 
 88. See generally PAUL DOUGLAS NEWMAN, FRIES’S REBELLION: THE ENDURING 
STRUGGLE FOR THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (2004). 
 89. 5 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF 
REFERENCE, TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF 
THE UNITED STATES; AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, app. B at 14 (Phila., 
William Young Birch & Abraham Small 1803) [hereinafter TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S 
COMMENTARIES]. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See id. 
 92. See id. 
 93. See id. 
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In Masciandaro, Judge Niemeyer noted the Second Amendment 
not only protected self-defense but also had to be read with its militia 
purpose in mind: 
Moreover, the right to keep and bear arms was found to have been 
understood to exist not only for self-defense, but also for 
membership in a militia and for hunting, neither of which is a home-
bound activity.  Indeed, one aspect of the right, as historically 
understood, was “to secure the ideal of a citizen militia, which might 
be necessary to oppose an oppressive military force if the 
constitutional order broke down.”94 
Judge Niemeyer extrapolates a right to carry a firearm from an 
unquestioned historical assumption about the way the militia 
functioned.  Niemeyer seems to assume that one would have needed 
to travel with a loaded gun to participate in the militia and effectuate 
the Second Amendment’s militia purpose.  Yet, in the case of the 
Second Amendment, historical facts and mythology are often at odds 
with one another.  In fact, states regulated the exercise of this right in 
a robust manner, including prohibiting militiamen from traveling with 
a loaded weapon to muster or parade.95  These types of regulations 
were uncontroversial exercises of the state’s police powers.96 
Finally, one must reckon with the common law constraints on the 
use of firearms in the Founding era and early republic.  The Statute of 
Northampton instructed individuals to “bring no force in affray of the 
peace, nor to go nor ride armed by night nor by day, in fairs, 
markets.”97  Modern scholars are divided over how to interpret the 
application of this statute in early American law.  In the view of Daryl 
Miller and Patrick Charles, the Statute of Northampton prohibited 
 
 94. United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 468 (2011) (Niemeyer, J., 
concurring) (internal citations omitted). 
 95. See, e.g., STATUTES OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY 765 (Trenton, Phillips & 
Bogswell 1847); see also THE REVISED STATUTES OF THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE 
161 (Concord, John F. Brown 1851).  Note that “parade” in this context is an 
essential part of the muster, in which weapons are inspected and fines levied.  See 
generally 5 Military Affairs AMERICAN STATE PAPERS.  DOCUMENTS, LEGISLATIVE 
AND EXECUTIVE, OF THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, FROM THE FIRST SESSION 
OF THE TWENTY-SECOND TO THE FIRST SESSION OF THE TWENTY-FOURTH CONGRESS, 
INCLUSIVE: COMMENCING MARCH 15, 1832, AND ENDING JANUARY 5, 1836 451-2 
(Asbury Dickins & John W. Forney eds., Gales & Seaton 1860). 
 96. WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 1–51 (1996). 
 97. Statute of Northampton, 1328, 2 Edw. 3, c. 3 (Eng.), available at http://press-
pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/print_documents/amendIIs1.html. 
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armed travel.98  Eugene Volokh, a leading academic champion of gun 
rights, rejects this view.  He argues that this “Statute was understood 
by the Framers as covering only those circumstances where carrying 
arms was unusual and therefore terrifying.”99  Volokh cites the 
interpretation of this statue by Sir William Hawkins, an important 
English legal commentator familiar to lawyers in the Founding era.100  
Hawkins formulation of this statute’s prohibition cast the prohibition 
in terms of traveling with unusual and dangerous weapons.101  This 
formulation was slightly different than Sir William Blackstone’s gloss 
on the law.  Blackstone did not describe the crime of affray in terms 
of traveling with “dangerous and unusual weapons,” but described 
the statute’s prohibition in terms of carrying “dangerous or unusual 
weapons.”102  The Founders were familiar with both English 
commentators and it seems likely that there may have been a range of 
views on interpreting this question.103 
It is easy for legal scholars and judges to lose sight of the social, 
cultural, and political contexts in which early American weapons 
regulations were enacted.  Founding era public policy on firearms had 
several objectives: disarm dangerous and disloyal groups, provide for 
the safe storage of gunpowder and firearms, and arm and regulate the 
militia.104  Interpersonal violence, including gun violence, simply was 
not a problem in the Founding era that warranted much attention and 
therefore produced no legislation.105  Times change, and the law 
 
 98. See Patrick J. Charles, The Faces of the Second Amendment Outside the 
Home: History Versus Ahistorical Standards of Review, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 8 
(2012); Darrell A. H. Miller, Guns as Smut: Defending the Home-Bound Second 
Amendment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1278, 1317 (2009). 
 99. Eugene Volokh, The First and Second Amendments, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 
SIDEBAR 97, 101 (2009). 
 100. See id. 
 101. Id.  Hawkins clearly believed one might not travel with offensive weapons.  
Defensive use of weapons in the home was clearly protected, but it is not clear how 
far this right extended beyond the home for the ordinary person.  Hawkins expressly 
noted that “persons of quality,” a term that signified elite status and class rank, were 
not subject to arms restrictions in public.  Thus, the right that Hawkins defined seems 
narrow, not expansive in scope. Id. 
 102. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *148–49 (1803). 
 103. St. George Tucker quotes both authors as good authority on the common law, 
but also notes that the common law had been modified in each of the American 
states. See 1 TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES, supra note 89, at *409. 
 104. For a discussion of early American gun regulation, see Saul Cornell & Nathan 
DeDino, A Well-Regulated Right: The Early American Origins of Gun Control, 73 
FORDHAM L. REV. 487, 491–505 (2004). 
 105. With the notable exception of laws addressing dueling, see An Act for the 
Punishing and Preventing of Duelling, 1719 Mass. Acts 135. 
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changes with them.106  As cheaper and more reliable handguns 
proliferated in large numbers and society underwent a host of 
profound social and economic changes in the early decades of the 
nineteenth century, handguns and knives gradually became a social 
problem.107  In response to a growing perception that these easily-
concealable weapons posed a serious threat to public safety, a 
number of states passed the first modern-style weapons control 
laws.108  These laws triggered the first cases testing the scope of the 
constitutional right to keep and bear arms under state law.109  For the 
first time in American history, courts were faced with deciding this 
issue: was the constitutional right to bear arms implicated when one 
armed oneself with a pistol or a knife outside of the home?110 
In Masciandaro, Judge Niemeyer relied on Eugene Volokh’s 
framework for implementing Heller.111  Unfortunately, this 
framework rests on a number of questionable historical assumptions 
and claims.  In particular, the contention that the “pre-Civil War 
American legal practice of treating open carrying of weapons as not 
only legal but constitutionally protected” rests more on historical 
mythology and a highly selective reading of the evidence than it does 
on sound historical research.112  In reality, Antebellum case law on the 
 
 106. See generally RANDOLPH ROTH, AMERICAN HOMICIDE (2009). 
 107. See CORNELL, A WELL-REGULATED MILITIA, supra note 18, at 137–50. 
 108. See infra notes 114–16 and accompanying text. 
 109. See infra notes 115–17 and accompanying text. 
 110. See id. 
 111. United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 468 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 112. Eugene Volokh, The First and Second Amendments, supra note 99, at 102; 
see also Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-
Defense: An Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443, 
1516-17, 1522-23 (2009) [hereinafter Volokh, Implementing].  To illustrate this view, 
Volokh quotes Willie Nelson’s Pancho & Lefty. See id. at 1523 n.331 (quoting WILLIE 
NELSON, PANCHO & LEFTY (Sony Records 1990)).  Vololkh acknowledges that “this 
is a modern source, of course, but one that also captures well the 1800s sentiments.” 
Id.  The song was actually written by Townes Van Zandt, who first recorded it on his 
1972 album, THE LATE GREAT TOWNES VAN ZANDT.  Without diminishing the 
artistry of Willie Nelson, or the song’s actual author, Townes Van Zandt, I think it is 
fair to say that the source tells us more about historical myth, than reality. Volokh’s 
inability to distinguish between myth and reality ought to raise additional concerns 
about his analysis.  For a brilliant exploration of such myths, including the 
appropriation of some aspects of the Mexican revolutionary figure Pancho Villa’s life 
by American artists and entertainers, see RICHARD SLOTKIN, GUNFIGHTER NATION: 
THE MYTH OF THE FRONTIER IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (1998).  If the song 
in part draws inspiration from Pancho Villa, it would be evidence for a twentieth 
century mythology, not a mythology associated with the 1800s.  For additional 
analysis of how Volokh’s questionable forays into law office history led the Supreme 
Court astray in Heller, see Saul Cornell, Heller, New Originalism, and Law Office 
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right to bear arms was deeply divided on the scope of the right.113  
There was a spectrum that ran from the libertarian view elaborated in 
Bliss v. Commonwealth114 to the more limited right described in 
Buzzard v. State.115  The Fourteenth Amendment largely resolved the 
division among southern Antebellum courts evidenced by this split.  
By the time the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, most legal 
commentators viewed Buzzard, not Bliss, as the orthodox view.116 
Legal scholarship is most trustworthy when focused on traditional 
doctrinal analysis.  Yet, narrow doctrinalism can obscure other 
important legal and historical sources, particularly if one focuses 
exclusively on cases and ignores legislation.  In areas of the law in 
which a broad constitutional consensus existed and laws were not 
challenged there would not be any body of case law to consult.  If one 
looks at legal scholarship on the right to bear arms, one of the most 
striking omissions is any attention to the law outside of the South.117  
Indeed, nearly all of the Antebellum gun cases, with a few notable 
exceptions, were decided in Southern courts by judges who were 
typically pro-slavery.118  This fact merits closer scrutiny.119 
 
History: “Meet the New Boss, Same as the Old Boss,” 56 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1111–
12 (2009) and David Thomas Konig, The Second Amendment: A Missing 
Transatlantic Context for the Historical Meaning of “the Right of the People to Keep 
and Bear Arms,” 22 LAW & HIST. REV. 119, 154 n.96 (2004). 
 113. See infra notes 120–29 and accompanying text. 
 114. Bliss v. Commonwealth, 12 Ky. 90 (1822). 
 115. State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18, 27 (1842). 
 116. For a discussion of the spectrum of antebellum jurisprudence and case law, 
see Saul Cornell & Justin Florence, The Right to Bear Arms in the Era of the 
Fourteenth Amendment: Gun Rights or Gun Regulation?, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 
1043, 1052–53 (2010). Compare Bliss, 12 Ky. 90 (declaring that Kentucky’s concealed-
weapons ban conflicted with the state constitution), superseded by state 
constitutional amendment, KY. CONST. of 1850 art. XIII, § 25, with Buzzard, 4 Ark. at 
27 (upholding arms regulation statute against constitutional challenge).  Volokh 
argues that in the aftermath of McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010), 
legal ideas and norms in the 1860s and 1870s are probative in evaluating 
contemporary gun regulations. See Volokh, Implementing, supra note 112, at 1524.  
For the opposing view, see Rostron, supra note 8. 
 117. For a good illustration of the problems of narrow doctrinalism, see generally 
Volokh, Implementing, supra note 112, and O’Shea, supra note 87, at 623–41. 
 118. The most important counterexamples from non-southern sources are a trio of 
Indiana cases: State v. Mitchell, 3 Blackf. 229 (Ind. 1833); Walls v. State, 7 Blackf. 572 
(Ind. 1845); State v. Duzan, 6 Blackf. 31 (Ind. 1841).  Of course, southern migration 
into Indiana may well account for these developments.  As historian Nicole Etcheson  
observes, “forty-four percent of such Hoosiers, thirty-five percent of such Illinoisans, 
and nineteen percent of such Ohioans were reported born in the Upland South.  
Since the southerners were the first migrants into these states, these figures disguise 
an even larger southern presence because the children and grandchildren of 
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IV.  THE PISTOL AND THE LASH: SLAVERY AND THE PERMISSIVE 
RIGHT TO CARRY 
It is not surprising that the vast majority of the early cases testing 
the limits and scope of the right to bear arms were Southern.  By the 
1820s, the Antebellum South was the most violent region in the new 
nation.120  Indeed, the South’s homicide rates were more than double 
that of the North’s most populous cities, New York and 
Philadelphia.121  Given the much higher homicide rates in the South, it 
is not surprising that this region led the way in passing the first 
modern style gun control laws.122 
Southern violence prompted extensive commentary by 
contemporaries and was put to effective use by abolitionists who 
linked this culture of violence to the brutality of slavery.123  Two 
particular symbols became emblems of the violence of the South: the 
pistol and the lash.124  The importance of these cultural associations is 
vividly captured in this cartoon from The American Anti-Slavery 
Almanac (1840)125:  
  
 
southerners were counted as born in Ohio, Indiana, or Illinois.” Nicole Etcheson, 
Manliness and the Political Culture of the Old Northwest, 1790–1860, 15 J. EARLY 
REP. 59, 60 n.2 (1995). 
 119. I would like to thank Professor Al Brophy of the University of North Carolina 
School of Law for suggesting this line of inquiry to me. 
 120. See ROTH, supra note 106.  Urban areas also experienced a rise in the use of 
weapons. See ERIC H. MONKKONEN, MURDER IN NEW YORK CITY (2001); see also 
Joshua Stein, Privatizing Violence: A Transformation in the Jurisprudence of 
Assault, 30 LAW & HIST. REV. 423, 445 (2012) (noting that in the three decades 
between 1810 and 1840 assaults rose dramatically as did the likelihood that such 
assaults would involve a weapon). 
 121. See ROTH, supra note 106. 
 122. On Southern violence, see DICKSON D. BRUCE, JR., VIOLENCE AND CULTURE 
IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH (1979) and BERTRAM WYATT-BROWN, SOUTHERN 
HONOR: ETHICS AND BEHAVIOR IN THE OLD SOUTH (1982). 
 123. See generally Bruce, supra note 122. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Our Peculiar Domestic Institutions, reprinted in THE AMERICAN ANTI-
SLAVERY ALMANAC 25 (New York, Am. Anti-Slavery Soc’y 1840), available at 
http://digitalgallery.nypl.org/nypldigital/dgkeysearchdetail.cfm?imageID=413034.  
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The scene depicted in the image melds together multiple examples 
of southern brutality.  In the distance, a cockfight draws a large crowd 
seeking the titillation provided by blood sport.  A gambling dispute 
turned deadly occupies the center of the picture.  On one side of the 
image, two gentlemen are about to fire on one another in a duel and a 
cruel southern master prepares to whip a young slave.  The fact that 
the South was the most violent region of the new nation ought to give 
scholars and judges pause before looking to this region for 
constitutional guidelines on how to interpret the meaning of the right 
to bear arms in the post-Heller era. 
If one looks closely at the foundation for Professor Volokh’s claim 
about the right to carry, it consists of a single and quite remarkable 
statement by the Richmond Grand Jury published in 1820.126  The 
Grand Jury denounced the pernicious practice of carrying concealed 
weapons, while affirming the right to carry arms openly. 
On Wearing Concealed Arms 
We, the Grand Jury for the city of Richmond, at August Court, 
1820, do not believe it to be inconsistent with our duty to 
animadvert upon any practice which, in our opinion, may be 
attended with consequences dangerous to the peace and good order 
of society.  We have observed, with regret, the very numerous 
instances of stabbing, which have of late years occurred, and which 
have been owing in most cases to the practice which has so 
frequently prevailed, of wearing dirks: Armed in secret, and 
 
 126. See Volokh, Implementing, supra note 112. 
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emboldened by the possession of these deadly weapons, how 
frequently have disputes been carried to extremities, which might 
otherwise have been either amicably adjusted, or attended with no 
serious consequences to the parties engaged. 
The Grand Jury would not recommend any legislative interference 
with what they conceive to be one of the most essential privileges of 
freemen, the right of carrying arms: But we feel it our duty publicly 
to express our abhorrence of a practice which it becomes all good 
citizens to frown upon with contempt, and to endeavor to suppress.  
We consider the practice of carrying arms secreted, in cases where 
no personal attack can reasonably be apprehended, to be infinitely 
more reprehensible than even the act of stabbing, if committed 
during a sudden affray, in the heat of passion, where the party was 
not previously armed for the purpose.127 
The idea that one might ban concealed carry if one allowed open 
carry did garner support in Nunn v. State, but there is little evidence 
that this case was understood to be a controlling precedent in the 
South, and it was certainly not viewed in this way by the era of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.128  In Hill v. State, Georgia’s Supreme Court 
rejected Nunn and asserted that it was “at a loss to follow the line of 
thought that extends the guarantee . . . to the right to carry pistols, 
dirks, Bowie-knives, and those other weapons of like character, 
which, as all admit, are the greatest nuisances of our day.”129  
Moreover, Nunn had no impact outside of the South.  Indeed, 
scholarship on the right to bear arms had been strangely silent about 
legal ideas and practices in these other areas of the nation, which 
included the vast majority of the free population. 
 
 127. On Wearing Concealed Arms, DAILY NAT’L. INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 9, 1820, at 
2. 
 128. Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 243 (1846).  For the pro-slavery beliefs of Judge 
Lumpkin, the author of the Nunn decision, see Mason W. Stephenson & D. Grier 
Stephenson, Jr., “To Protect and Defend”: Joseph Henry Lumpkin, The Supreme 
Court of Georgia, and Slavery, 25 EMORY L.J. 579, 582-86 (1976).  For a discussion of 
how the antebellum tradition was interpreted during the era of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, see Cornell & Florence, supra note 116, at 1066–69.  For good examples 
of other antebellum models, see generally Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. 154 (1840) and 
State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18 (1842). 
 129. Hill v. State, 53 Ga. 472, 474 (1874) (rejecting the logic of Nunn, but assuming 
arguendo that the law in question was constitutional even if Nunn were correctly 
decided). 
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V.  NO RIGHT TO CARRY: THE EMERGENCE AND SPREAD OF THE 
MASSACHUSETTS MODEL 
Outside of the South, a robust model of weapons regulation 
emerged and gained widespread acceptance.  Prohibitions on 
concealed carry were one type of regulation.130  A number of states 
and localities adapted the Statute of Northampton’s prohibition on 
traveling armed, rewriting it in terms that made clear that one cannot 
travel with offensive weapons.131  Laws of this type weren’t the only 
prohibitions on traveling armed.  States enacted bans on the use of 
arms in sensitive places.132  Finally, some states and localities enacted 
 
 130. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 929 (1881) (“If any person shall carry upon his 
person any concealed weapon . . . [he] shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, 
upon conviction thereof, shall be fined . . . or imprisoned . . . not more than thirty 
days . . . .”); 1883 WIS. SESS. LAWS 713 (“To regulate or prohibit the carrying or 
wearing by any person under his clothes, or concealed about his person, of any pistol 
or colt, or slung shot, or cross knuckles, or knuckles of lead, brass or other metal, or 
bowie knife, dirk knife, or dirk or dagger, or any other dangerous or deadly weapon; 
and to provide for the confiscation or sale of such weapon.”). 
 131. There are many examples of laws prohibiting offensively arming oneself. See 
1849 Cal. Stat. 245 (“[I]f any person shall have upon him any pistol, gun, knife, dirk, 
bludgeon, or other offensive weapon, with intent to assault any person, every such 
person, on conviction, shall be fined not more than one hundred dollars or 
imprisoned in the County Jail not more than three months.”); 19 Del. Laws 733 
(1852) (“Any justice of the peace may also cause to be arrested . . . all who go armed 
offensively to the terror of the people, or are otherwise disorderly and dangerous.”). 
 132. See 1870 La. Acts 61 (“[I]t shall be unlawful for any person to carry any gun, 
pistol, bowie-knife or other dangerous weapon, concealed or unconcealed, on any 
day of election during the hours the polls are open, or on any day of registration or 
revision of registration, within a distance of one-half mile of any place of registration 
or revision of registration; any person violating the provisions of this section shall be 
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor.”); 1870 Tex. Gen. Laws 63 (“[I]f any person shall 
go into any church or religious assembly, any school room or other place where 
persons are assembled for educational, literary or scientific purposes, or into a 
ballroom, social party or other social gathering composed of ladies and gentlemen, or 
to any election precinct on the day or days of any election, where any portion of the 
people of this State are collected to vote at any election, or to any other place where 
people may be assembled to muster or to perform any other public duty, or any other 
public assembly, and shall have about his person a bowie knife, dirk or butcher knife, 
or fire-arms, whether known as a six shooter, gun or pistol of any kind, such person 
so offending shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof 
shall be fined in a sum not less than fifty or more than five hundred dollars, at the 
discretion of the court or jury trying the same . . . .”); 1878 Va. Acts 37 (“If any 
person carrying any gun, pistol, bowie-knife, dagger, or other dangerous weapon, to 
any place of worship while a meeting for religious purposes is being held at such 
place, or without good and sufficient cause therefor, shall carry any such weapon on 
Sunday at any place other than his own premises, shall be fined not less than twenty 
dollars.”); 1859 Wash. Sess. Laws 489 (“Every person who shall convey into any 
penitentiary, jail or house of correction, or house of reformation, any disguise, or any 
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even more sweeping regulations, including complete bans on 
traveling armed.  In 1835, Massachusetts passed a sweeping law that 
effectively prohibited the right to travel armed. 
If any person shall go armed with a dirk, dagger, sword, pistol, or 
other offensive and dangerous weapon, without reasonable cause to 
fear an assault or other injury, or violence to his person, or to his 
family or property, he may on complaint of any person having 
reasonable cause to fear an injury, or breach of the peace, be 
required to find sureties for keeping the peace.133 
The respected jurist Peter Oxenbridge Thacher commented on this 
law in a grand jury charge that drew praise in the contemporary 
press.134  According to this model, one might ban open and concealed 
carry, as long as one allowed an exception for cases in which an 
individual had a reasonable fear of imminent violence.135 
 Volokh is correct that bans on concealed weapons were 
uncontroversial.  It is therefore hardly surprising that Thacher shared 
the dominant cultural view of the day regarding the practice of 
arming oneself with concealed weapons.  Such a practice was 
cowardly, if not dastardly.  This did not mean that one had a right to 
carry openly.  The alternative to concealed carry was not open carry, 
but rigorous enforcement of the law, which forbade arming oneself 
except in unusual situations.  Thacher’s grand jury charge was 
emphatic about the limited nature of this right: 
In our own Commonwealth [of Massachusetts], no person may go 
armed with a dirk, dagger, sword, pistol, or other offensive and 
dangerous weapon, without reasonable cause to apprehend an 
assault or violence to his person, family, or property.  Where the 
practice of wearing secret arms prevails, it indicates either that the 
 
instrument, tool, weapon or other thing, adapted to or useful in aiding any prisoner 
there lawfully committed or detained, to make escape . . . shall, on conviction thereof, 
be imprisoned . . . .”). 
 133. 1835 Mass. Acts 750. 
 134. See PETER OXENBRIDGE THACHER, TWO CHARGES TO THE GRAND JURY OF 
THE COUNTY OF SUFFOLK FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, AT THE 
OPENING OF TERMS OF THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE CITY OF BOSTON, ON 
MONDAY, DECEMBER 5TH, A.D. 1836 AND ON MONDAY, MARCH 13TH, A.D. 27-28 
(1837).  The section of the grand jury charge dealing with traveling armed was 
excerpted and reprinted in Judge Thacher’s Charges, CHRISTIAN REGISTER & 
BOSTON OBSERVER, June 10, 1837, at 91.  For additional discussion of the 
Massachusetts model, see ELISHA HAMMOND, A PRACTICAL TREATISE; OR AN 
ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW APPERTAINING TO THE OFFICE OF JUSTICE OF THE 
PEACE; AND ALSO RELATING TO THE PRACTICE IN JUSTICES’ COURTS, IN CIVIL AND 
CRIMINAL MATTERS, WITH APPROPRIATE FORMS OF PRACTICE 184–86 (1841). 
 135. See sources cited supra note 130. 
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laws are bad; or that they are not executed with vigor; or, at least, it 
proves want of confidence in their protection.  It often leads to the 
sudden commission of acts of atrocious injury; and induces the 
individual to rely for defence on himself, rather than on society.  But 
how vain and impotent is the power of a single arm, however skilled 
in the science of defence, to protect its possessor from the many evil 
persons who infest society.  The possession of a concealed dagger is 
apt to produce an elation of mind, which raises itself above the 
dictates both of prudence and law.  The possessor, stimulated by a 
sensitive notion of honor, and constituting himself the sole judge of 
his rights, may suddenly commit a deed, for which a life of penitence 
will hardly, even in his own estimation, atone. When you survey the 
society to which you belong, and consider the various wants of its 
members;—their numbers, their variety of occupation and 
character,—their conflicting interests and wants . . . what is it, permit 
me to ask, preserves the common peace and safety? I know of no 
answer, but THE LAW.136 
Thacher’s account of the Massachusetts law prohibiting the right to 
carry arms unambiguously interprets this law as a broad ban on the 
use of arms in public.  In Massachusetts and those states emulating its 
model, the scope of the right to arm oneself defensively outside of the 
home was extremely limited.137  Thacher believed that the state could 
ban all carrying of firearms, as long as there was an affirmative legal 
defense available allowing an exception when there was a clear and 
tangible threat to justify arming oneself defensively.138  Demonstrating 
a reasonable fear, it is important to note, imposed a high legal 
standard.  In State v. Duke, the Supreme Court of Texas upheld a 
comprehensive ban on traveling armed.139  Texas law also defined the 
standard of reasonableness in the following way: 
Any person charged under the first Section of this Act, who may 
offer to prove by way of defense, that he was in danger of an attack 
on his person, or unlawful interference with his property, shall be 
required to show that such danger was immediate and pressing, and 
was of such a nature as to alarm a person of ordinary courage; and 
that the arms so carried were borne openly, and not concealed 
beneath the clothing; and if it shall appear that this danger had its 
 
 136. Judge Thacher’s Charges, supra note 134, at 91. 
 137. See sources cited infra note 141. 
 138. See id. 
 139. See State v. Duke, 42 Tex. 455, 459 (1874). 
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origin in a difficulty first commenced by the accused, it shall not be 
considered a legal defense.140 
The case also drew a clear line between the use of arms within the 
home and the use of them in public.  The former enjoyed far greater 
protection than the latter. Thus, even in the region of the nation with 
the most permissive attitude toward the right to carry, a more 
stringent and limited conception of this right had emerged by the era 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Outside of the South, the limited right to carry pioneered by 
Massachusetts was emulated by a number of states.  A similar legal 
standard emerged in Maine, Delaware, The District of Columbia, 
Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, Oregon, and Minnesota.141  Rather than 
demonstrate a consensus on a right to open carry, the historical 
record demonstrates that outside of the slave South, a radically 
different and far more limited conception of the right to travel armed 
emerged.  Indeed, by the era of the Fourteenth Amendment, this 
more limited model had also gained legislative approval and judicial 
support in parts of the South.142  To assert this right, one had to be 
able to demonstrate clear evidence of a reasonable fear of imminent 
 
 140. Id. at 457. 
 141. See 19 DEL. LAWS 733 (1852); D.C. Code § 16 (1857) (“If any person shall go 
armed with a dirk, dagger, sword, pistol, or other offensive and dangerous weapon, 
without reasonable cause to fear an assault or other injury or violence to his person . . 
. .”); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 12 § 16 (1840) (“Any person, going armed with any dirk, 
dagger, sword, pistol, or other offensive and dangerous weapon, without a reasonable 
cause to fear an assault on himself . . . .”); WIS. STAT. § 16 (1857) (“If any person shall 
go armed with a dirk, dagger, sword, pistol or pistols, or other offensive and 
dangerous weapon, without reasonable cause to fear an assault or other injury or 
violence to his person . . . .”); JOHN PURDON, A DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF 
PENNSYLVANIA, FROM THE YEAR ONE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED TO THE 
TWENTY-FIRST DAY OF MAY, ONE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED AND SIXTY-ONE 250 
(9th ed., 1862) (“If any person, not being an officer on duty in the military or naval 
service of the state or of the United States, shall go armed with a dirk, dagger, sword 
or pistol, or other offensive or dangerous weapon, without reasonable cause to fear 
an assault or other injury or violence . . . .”); THE STATUTES OF OREGON, ENACTED, 
AND CONTINUED IN FORCE, BY THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY 243 (1855); GEORGE B. 
YOUNG, THE GENERAL STATUTES OF THE STATE OF MINNESOTA, AS AMENDED BY 
SUBSEQUENT LEGISLATION, WITH WHICH ARE INCORPORATED ALL GENERAL LAWS 
OF THE STATE IN FORCE AT THE CLOSE OF THE LEGISLATIVE SESSION OF 1878 629 (St. 
Paul, 1879) (“Whoever goes armed with a dirk, dagger, sword, pistol or pistols, or 
other offensive and dangerous weapons, without reasonable cause to fear an assault 
or other injury or violence to his person . . . .”).  For a discussion of these laws in the 
context of the Statute of Northampton, see Charles, supra note 98. 
 142. See, e.g., Duke, 42 Tex. 455. 
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danger before one might legally arm oneself.143  The notion of a strong 
tradition of a right to carry outside of the home rests on a set of 
historical myths and a highly selective reading of the evidence.  The 
only persuasive evidence for a strong tradition of permissive open 
carry is limited to the slave South. 
There is little consensus among judges and scholars about how to 
interpret the Constitution.  Even among those who profess to be 
supporters of originalism, there is considerable disagreement over 
originalist methodology.  In Heller, the Supreme Court seemed to 
gesture toward the new originalism and its focus on public meaning.  
In McDonald, however, the same five-person majority embraced 
aspects of traditional originalism and its emphasis on discerning the 
intent of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment.144  The scholarly 
debate over the merits and flaws in originalist methodology is 
voluminous.  Even accepting the Court’s inconsistent and, at times, 
incoherent originalist methodology, there is simply no compelling 
historical evidence of a broad legal consensus on a right to carry non-
militia weapons outside of the home.  Indeed, there is considerable 
evidence suggesting that a legal consensus had emerged outside of the 
South that no such right existed.  The available evidence strongly 
suggests that laws restricting the use of firearms outside of the home 
were the legal norm.145 
 
 143. These statutes clearly use common law approaches to remedy the evil the 
legislature perceived.  These laws banned a dangerous practice, but acknowledged an 
exception by allowing individuals to arm themselves in cases where there was a 
reasonable fear of imminent danger.  The enforcement mechanism also relies on a 
common law model: surety of peace.  In an age before modern police forces, when 
most American lived in smaller rural communities, and there was no modern 
regulatory or administrative state, adopting this common law approach would have 
seemed quite natural to legislatures, constables, and judges.  This fact was reflected in 
guidebooks written for justices of the peace and constables. See, e.g., HAMMOND, 
supra note 134; see also NOVAK, supra note 96, at 235-48 (generally discussing the 
common law’s conception of regulation and enforcement); ALLEN STEINBERG, THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE:  PHILADELPHIA, 1800-1880 (1989) 
(demonstrating that peace bonds were an essential means of criminal justice 
enforcement in the era before professional police forces and the rise of the modern 
administrative state). 
 144. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). 
 145. On methodological and interpretive issues relevant to original intent 
originalism, see INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL 
INTENT (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1990) and Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: 
A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1085 (1989).  On New Originalism, see 
Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism For Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 620 
(1999); Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 398 
(2002); and Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
CORNELL_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 2/6/2013  10:46 PM 
1724 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXIX 
This conclusion should hardly come as a shock to anyone familiar 
with the history of Reconstruction.  Indeed, Reconstruction-era 
Republicans were strong supporters of generally applicable and 
racially neutral gun regulations, including in some cases, bans on 
traveling armed and bans on handguns.  Gun regulation in the years 
after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment became stricter, not 
looser.146  The idea that American law recognized a right to carry 
firearms in public is more supported by a Hollywood myth of the 
“wild west” than historical reality.147  Even in Dodge City, that 
epitome of the Wild West, gun carrying was prohibited.148 
The eminent jurist John Forrest Dillon, analyzed the importance of 
the reasonable threat exception to broad restrictions.149  In a series of 
essays published in the Central Law Journal in 1874, Dillon explored 
the complex legacy of American jurisprudence on the issue of the 
 
599 (2004).  Another variant of this theory, semantic originalism, focuses on linguistic 
meaning, sometimes described as sentence meaning, timeless meaning, or semantic 
meaning. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and 
Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 923 (2009).  Finally, a less popular alternative 
suggests using the Founders interpretive methods. See John O. McGinnis & Michael 
Rappaport, Original Interpretive Principles as the Core of Originalism, 24 CONST. 
COMMENT. 371, 374 (2007).  Recent critiques of New Originalism include Mitchell N. 
Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2009); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., 
Are Originalist Constitutional Theories Principled, or Are They Rationalizations for 
Conservatism?, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5 (2011); and Stephen M. Griffin, 
Rebooting Originalism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1185 (2008). 
 146. See Carole Emberton, The Limits of Incorporation: Violence, Gun Rights, 
and Gun Regulation in the Reconstruction South, 17 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 615 
(2006).  While gun rights advocates have attempted to portray Reconstruction-era 
Republicans as radical gun rights advocates, the historical reality is far more complex.  
Abolitionists were divided over the legitimacy of armed self-defense.  Antebellum 
abolitionism existed along a spectrum that ran from John Brown’s insurrectionary 
theory to Quaker pacifism.  Reconstruction-era Republicans were also heirs to the 
antebellum Whig ideal of the well-regulated state. See also Cornell & Florence, supra 
note 116, at 1060 (discussing evidence of Reconstruction-era support for racially 
neutral gun regulations intended to promote public safety). 
 147. See Winkler, supra note 2, at 165. 
 148. Slotkin, supra note 112.  On restrictions in the “wild west,” see Dodge City, 
Kan., Ordinance No. 16, § XI (Sept. 22, 1876) and 1876 Wyo. Comp. Laws 52, § 1 
(prohibiting anyone from “bear[ing] upon his person, concealed or openly, any fire 
arm or other deadly weapon, within the limits of any city, town or village.”). 
 149. Volokh, supra note 99.  Judge Niemeyer and Judge Legg in the Fourth Circuit 
may have erred in putting too much faith in Volokh’s version of the past. See United 
States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 468 (4th Cir. 2011) (Niemeyer, J., concurring); 
Woollard v. Sheridan, No. L-10-2068, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28498, at *16–17 (D. 
Md. Mar. 2, 2012). 
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right to bear arms, the right of self-defense, and the right to carry.150  
Dillon’s views were similar to those of another celebrated legal 
theorist of this era, Joel Prentiss Bishop.151  Both men acknowledged 
that the law had to balance the legitimate rights of individual self-
defense against the needs of public safety.152  Dillon’s discussion of 
this issue was especially thoughtful.  Drawing on a recent case, 
Andrews v. State, he concluded, “every good citizen is bound to yield 
his preference as to the means [of self-defense] to be used, to the 
demands of the public good.”153  The state’s compelling interest in 
promoting public safety did not alter the fact that there “are 
circumstances under which to disarm a citizen would be to leave his 
life at the mercy of treacherous and plotting enemy.”154  Dillon’s 
solution to this dilemma was not permissive open carry.  He turned to 
a common law rule that had been absorbed into the Massachusetts 
statute prohibiting traveling armed.155  If one armed oneself contrary 
to a legal prohibition and a genuine threat existed, and “[i]f such a 
state of facts were clearly proven,” he opined, it would “clearly be 
said to fall within that class of cases in which the previously existing 
common law interpolates exceptions upon subsequently enacted 
statutes.”156  Dillon concluded that as far as the right to carry went, 
states might regulate this practice and prohibit it entirely as long as 
the common law self-defense exception was recognized.  Dillion’s 
summary of the state of the law in the era of the Fourteenth 
Amendment is hard to reconcile with the views of pro-gun scholars 
such as Volokh and O’Shea.  “Every state,” Dillion wrote, “has power 
to regulate the bearing of arms in such manner as it may see fit, or to 
restrain it altogether.”157 
 
 150. John Forrest Dillon, The Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Public and Private 
Defense, 1 CENT. L.J. 259 (1874). 
 151. See generally JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 
(7th ed. 1882). 
 152. See id.; see also Dillon, supra note 149. 
 153. Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. 165, 188 (1871). 
 154. Dillon, supra note 149, at 286. 
 155. See id.; see also OR. REV. STAT. § 16.17 (1855). 
 156. See Dillon, supra note 149, at 286. 
 157. See Dillon, supra note 149, at 296; see also BISHOP, supra note 150. 
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CONCLUSION: THE PAST AND FUTURE OF THE RIGHT TO CARRY 
ARMS OUTSIDE THE HOME 
In attempting to fashion a workable firearms jurisprudence in the 
post-Heller era, judges are likely to continue to consult history, and 
therefore face all of the problems that have been identified by 
Heller’s critics on the left and right.158  The claim that there was a 
broad consensus in Antebellum law on a right to carry openly 
mistakenly equates a distinctively Southern tradition of permissive 
carry with the existence of a larger constitutional consensus on this 
question.159  The dominant legal tradition in America was not open 
carry, but quite the opposite.  A broad range of restrictions on the use 
of arms in public, including bans on the right to carry in public, 
emerged in the decades after the adoption of the Second 
Amendment.  Rather than look to the slave South as the foundation 
for crafting “an analytical framework” for the post-Heller era, judges 
would do better to look to the North and the Massachusetts model.  
Robust regulation, including bans on traveling armed, are clearly 
constitutional and consistent with Heller’s recognition of long 
standing historical traditions of arms regulation in America.160 
 
 158. For a discussion of the problems with courts ignoring professional historians 
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A. Posner, In Defense of Looseness: The Supreme Court and Gun Control, THE NEW 
REPUBLIC, Aug. 27, 2008, at 38–40. 
 159. See Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243 (1846). 
 160. See Woollard v. Sheridan, No. L-10-2068, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28498 (D. Md. 
Mar. 2, 2012) (targeting a law derivative of the Massachusetts model); see also MD. 
CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 5-306(a)(5)(ii) (West 2011) (“[T]he Secretary shall issue 
a permit within a reasonable time to a person who the Secretary finds . . . has good 
and substantial reason to wear, carry, or transport a handgun, such as a finding that 
the permit is necessary as a reasonable precaution against apprehended danger.”). 
